

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

July 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM

TO : CCA - Mr. Crimmins
FROM : INR - George C. Denney, Jr. *b.l.d.f.*
SUBJECT: Cuba: Possible Courses of Action

This paper, prepared solely by a member of the INR Special Studies Group who, among others from INR, has represented INR on the Cuba Coordinating Committee, presents a concept and offers some possible courses of action towards Cuba. It is submitted for your possible interest.

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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
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Summary and Recommendations

US policy seeks to achieve an independent, democratic, and socially progressive Cuba and to erase the communist presence in Cuba which constitutes a foreign imposition on the Cuban people and a threat to hemispheric security. The problem discussed in this paper is how to gain these objectives without resort to invasion or attributable acts of violence and violations of international law. To this end the paper offers specific proposals and guidelines for: 1) discrediting Fidel Castro and his communist regime in Latin America, 2) destroying his image in Cuba, and 3) creating the necessary preconditions for nationalist upheaval inside Cuba within two years.

Public expression of US policy should parallel the useful distinction made during the missile crisis when action was directed not against Castro but against the communist military threat emanating from Cuba. It should now be aimed publicly not at getting rid of Castro -- since this only increases his popularity with the nationalistic Cuban people -- but at removing the threat posed by the communist presence in Cuba. The public position should be: Castro is not a threat to us, but a mere puppet who has violated Cuban liberty, dignity and well-being; the communist presence in Cuba, however, constitutes a totalitarian and subversive force in this hemisphere and therefore remains unacceptable.

In short, we suggest that the US government publicly disengage from Castro while continuing indirect action against him in order to overthrow his communist regime. Accordingly, the following action is recommended:

- a. Indirectly guide nationalist revolutionary exile groups with reputations that remain untarnished (through non-identification with Batista, the Brigade, or US interests) in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime from within, under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement." We propose that reputable exile leaders such as Manolo Ray Ernesto Betancourt and Javier Pazos: 1) be informed by Rómulo Betancourt that the US expects them to assume the main leadership role in this endeavor without involving the US; 2) be offered for their consideration the strategy, Revolutionary Objectives and Revolutionary Program set forth herein; 3) be encouraged to initiate a several-month campaign of radio harassment as a prelude to fomenting organized sabotage, subversion and guerrilla warfare against the Castro regime; and 4) announce their Revolutionary Program on July 26, 1963, seemingly, if not actually, from the Cuban mainland.

b. Reverse the present David-Goliath relationship with Cuba by having a smaller and militarily helpless Central American state, with a highly respected leader, engage Castro in a propaganda struggle in order to distract Castro and provoke him into threatening and unwise countermoves. If successful this will serve several purposes: 1) make an ordinary bully out of a heroically posturing Castro, cause him to lose self-esteem, and possibly involve him in a chain reaction of mistakes, 2) increase Latin American concern over Cuban subversion and promote OAS cooperation in defense of a small nation (the US should be the last to interfere overtly), 3) provide the US with an excuse to take further action against Cuba, should such escalation become desirable, and 4) present Cuba-obsessed American public opinion with a new outlook on a Castro cut down to smaller dimensions.

c. Coincidental with this baiting of Castro, and without attribution to the US, mount a campaign to destroy Castro's image through ridicule.

US strategy should be directed toward achieving the eventual downfall of the Castro/Communist regime as a result of internal stresses and in response to forces largely, if not wholly, unattributable to the US. Without fanfare and through the employment of overtly legal measures, and without displaying undue concern about Cuban diplomatic relations and marginal trade with such countries as Uruguay and Chile, the US should continue to seek the economic and political isolation of Cuba from the free world.

The Cuban regime contains the seeds of its own destruction. We believe that progress in promoting its destruction can be made in such a way as to increase US prestige in Latin America and give immediate impetus to the Alliance for Progress program.

Rationale of Proposals

The strategy proposed here is intended to supplement present measures against Cuba, and to offer operational and psychological guidelines, at the same time that it dovetails with recent policy on exile groups. It seeks to place the Cuban problem in perspective, subordinating it to more vital national and hemispheric issues. If this strategy is based on realistic assumptions and accurate analysis, it will serve as a public relations guide for the emotionally charged Cuban problem both in the

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US and abroad. Although we cannot assume that the Castro regime can be toppled by the proposed measures within twenty-four months, these proposals involve no US military commitment or financial cost, and we recommend that they be implemented without delay.

The fact that the nationalist symbol personified by Castro is now essential to communist success places the vulnerability of the Castro/Communist regime in one person and makes him the logical operational target. However, the indoctrination of Cuban youth is proceeding apace, and the loyalty of this group is being strengthened by the regime's assignment of responsible roles to relatively young cadres. Furthermore, as communist indoctrination and totalitarian organizational techniques become more effective, the communist apparatus will be able to function perhaps even more efficiently without Castro. His symbolic value in Latin America, however, would continue to be a communist asset.

Although Castro is an unreliable ally who is actually neither puppet nor neutralist, the Soviet Union is committed to supplying massive aid to him. Given the scope of this investment, there is small chance of negotiating the communist presence (foreign and local) out of Cuba. Activist Cubans inside the island, who are capable of fomenting an upheaval, view as the alternative to Communism not a democratic state but either a repetition of Batista or an American occupation. Consequently, many Cubans actually prefer Castro to foreseeable governments. They should be afforded a Cuban nationalist alternative. Moreover, a purely Cuban solution to the Cuban problem has a great advantage -- it avoids direct confrontation between the US and the Soviet Union.

If the Castro/Communist experiment will appear to have failed not on its own merits but as a result of obvious or inadequately disguised US intervention, or as a consequence of the fraudulent invocation (in Latin American eyes) of a unilateral and lopsided Monroe Doctrine, the validity of Castro's revolutionary course might remain unquestioned. This Castro/Communist experiment constitutes a genuine social revolution, albeit a perverted one. If it is interrupted by the force of the world's foremost "imperialist" and "capitalist" power in the absence of major provocation, such action will discredit the US and tend to validate the uncompleted experiment. Further Castro-type revolutions will then be stimulated rather than discouraged, since it will appear to many that social revolution (peaceful or otherwise) -- and not just communism -- has been outlawed by the US in this area. It is not the winning of this kind of battle but the manner in which it is won that will determine the success or failure of US policy in the hemisphere.

Assassination of Castro is excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom and because of the attribution risk which might invite fanatical retribution. It is preferable to discredit Castro, destroy his self-esteem, sabotage his revolution, force him to conclude that his situation is hopeless and, as in the case of his political idol Eduardo Chibas, in 1951, drive him to suicide or to acts of complete irrationality. While suicide is not expected, it is reasonable to anticipate that sustained harassment and denigration of Castro plus frustration of communist plans within Cuba will provoke turmoil and set the stage for the regime's collapse.

The targets of pressure, influence, and support in Cuba are the military, urban labor (in particular pre-Castro trade union members), student, bureaucratic, and other groups that are susceptible to disenchantment with Castro. The Cuban masses are at least passively loyal to Castro and not a major target. Action against Cuban and bloc ships even within the Cuban three mile limit should be avoided, in order to deny the Soviet Union an excuse for claiming attack in international waters, which would allow them to use this issue to obscure Castro's reversals by confusing Cuban and world opinion.

The greatest weapon against Communist subversion and recurrent disorder in Latin America would be convincing evidence that the Alliance for Progress is in forward motion and that the internal social reforms upon which it is dependent are being carried out. US strategy must recognize that such reforms are initiated in response to political pressure, which can only be applied by an articulate electorate, literate and instructed in democratic practices. Perhaps the greatest stumbling block to effective implementation of the Alliance program is the Latin American feeling that it is essentially a negative anti-Cuba policy. Unless the Alliance for Progress is dissociated from our anti-Castro/Communist programs and policy, Castro can successfully exploit this association to destroy the hopes of Cuban and other Latin American idealists.

US pressure tactics to obtain collective OAS measures against Castro's regime often result in creating resentment against the US and sympathy for Cuba. Legal victories of tactical value, unsupported by Latin American public opinion, or supported by disreputable and transient regimes, should not obscure continuing problems which may become a source of later political defeats. Other OAS members should continue to be encouraged to accept more responsibility for the Cuban problem, even to the extent of putting forth solutions we may not favor.

Possible OAS attempts, promoted by such countries as Mexico and Brazil, to reach an understanding with Castro can always be used to publicize conditions within Cuba by posing such terms as: holding of elections (a nudge to Ecuador, Paraguay, Haiti, and Guatemala), releasing political prisoners, university autonomy, reintegration of exiles, and Cuban cooperation against foreign subversion.

Revolutionary Nationalism versus Communism

A. Exiles Stimulate Nationalist Alternative

Reputable exile groups, such as are led by Manolo Ray, embody a nationalist alternative to a Castro/Communist dominated Cuba, but they must appear to operate without US support from Latin American bases. Only by appealing to Cuban nationalism and by supporting the original aims of the Cuban revolution can the exiles stimulate and promote action which will retain the passivity of the masses, dampen the enthusiasm of Cuban youth, gain the support of urban labor, weaken the loyalty of cadre elements -- who in vast majority are not now Communists -- and turn them against the communist regime.

At a carefully determined appropriate time, Soviet installations on the Cuban mainland should be attacked by exile and local guerrillas on a large scale. Severe reprisals against these Cuban action elements might provide a lever for creating antagonism between the Soviets and the Cuban people. If properly exploited and publicized by non-US media, a quiet rage could accumulate in the minds of at least some of the 300,000 Cubans under arms. Since the US will appear dissociated from this activity and unable to control it, it will be justified in publicly ignoring any Soviet or Castro complaints. Although there would be some risk of escalation, we should be prepared to meet it in order to permit Cuban patriots to evict the Communists from Cuba.

No public encouragement should be given the Cuban exiles beyond the universally accepted acknowledgement that patriots have the right to fight for the independence and freedom of their own countries. Reputable exile elements should obtain their moral and material support from such countries as Venezuela and Costa Rica. Direct US assistance should be avoided or channeled through the governments of the above-mentioned countries. Excessive US or even foreign assistance or involvement will become known and thus tend to sap Cuban nationalist initiative, lessen revolutionary motivation and appeal, and allow Castro convincingly to blame the US.

Although exiles can be instrumental in establishing the preconditions of successful revolt, the main effort must come from within Cuba. With proper guidance (from Batancourt, Orlich or Americans they trust) reputable exiles can present an appealing program, create a mystique and a provisional leadership symbol in imprisoned revolutionary hero Major Huber Matos, and initiate the psychological and operational program to discredit Castro and provoke internal revolt.

The uprisings in Poland and East Germany and the successful revolt in Hungary were crushed by the use or threat of use of massive military force: large Soviet armies were stationed on their territories. In contrast, the absence of an occupation army permitted Yugoslavia to exert its independence. For the same reason, and also because of geographical separation, little Albania not only maintains its independence from, but also brazenly thumbs its nose at, Moscow. And, with a few hundred men Castro overthrew a regime whose forces were equipped and trained by the US. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that if the well-armed Cubans should decide to revolt, the small number of Soviet troops there would almost certainly act wisely by remaining in their barracks.

Except for specific actions, outside inducements and pressures for exile political unity only internationalize and thus neutralize their most cohesive element -- nationalism. For example, an exile government would only be discredited as a US puppet and have no appeal within Cuba at this time. Similarly, whenever an exile group is closely identified with the US or its interests, Castro is able to rally Cuban nationalism to his support. Center and left-of-center groups need not be alienated, but it is only the revolutionary exiles who can convey nationalist conviction to potential upheavalists in Cuba; this nationalist focus is a tactical communications device.

Some exile action groups are cooperating among themselves. In exchange for supplies and by demonstrating more effective leadership, the more reputable ones could perform a coordinating function. For action purposes these units should add to their own emblems that of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement." The latter might infuriate Castro and confuse his supporters. Formal political unity is largely irrelevant and should not be pressed.

Mutuality of interest and proven trust remain the most effective means of influencing exile groups toward cooperative action. Any attempt by a foreign power to control exile activities will corrupt and discredit them or reveal that their integrity can be purchased. In Castro's own words: "Revolutions are carried out on a basis of morality."

As a reputable exile, Castro trained with his men in Mexico and solicited funds in New York City. After he landed in Cuba and commenced organized guerrilla activity, he expressed this view of the function of non-combatant exiles:

Exiles should cooperate in the struggle, but it is absurd for them to try to tell us from abroad what peak we should take, what sugar field we should burn, what sabotage we should perform, or at what moment and in what circumstances and form we should unloose the general strike. In addition to being absurd, it is ridiculous. Help us from abroad by collecting money among the exiles and the Cuban emigrants, by campaigning for the cause of Cuba in the press and in public opinion. Denounce the crimes we are suffering here, but do not pretend to direct from Miami the revolution that is being waged in all of the cities and country places of the island through fighting, agitating, sabotaging and striking and thousands of other forms of revolutionary action, which have been the war strategy of the 26th of July Movement.

Although Castro fought very few battles in the Sierra Maestra, he was able to broadcast fairly regularly to the Cuban people (reportedly by tapes via Radio Caracas). His kind treatment of the local peasantry, and their consequent passive adherence to his cause, plus the relative indifference of the Cuban military forces sent against him (mostly interested in plunder) were special circumstances which no guerrilla unit can hope to duplicate within the present totalitarian security arrangement. While guerrilla activity in Cuba now usually has tragic results, this action perhaps cannot and probably should not be discouraged. However, such action units require guidance and coordination of their losses are to be reduced and their effectiveness increased. This need could be filled by revolutionary exile radio, which should promote not revolt, but relatively less risky sabotage (spiking highways accommodating Soviet trucks) and passive resistance. Discouraging revolt at this time would give this radio an aura of wisdom and authority and also suggest its certainty about the coming revolt and its timing: "Do not revolt now!", has an ominous ring.

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B. Revolutionary Objectives

Only by drawing to themselves the very powerful force of Cuban nationalism can the reputable exiles undermine the present Cuban regime and provoke a revolt or palace revolution against Castro. Towards this end they must be able to:

- 1) convince the Cuban people that they are against any foreign interference, US or Soviet;
- 2) convince the Cuban people that they are engaged in an internal struggle, indifferent to whether or not this is part of a global Cold War;
- 3) convey certainty of ultimate victory and demonstrate willingness to sacrifice;
- 4) identify themselves with the original aims of the Cuban revolution, the Constitution of 1940 as amended in the light of history since 1958, and the ideas of Marti;
- 5) separate patriots from ambitious politicos, reduce dissension among reputable exiles, encourage internal leadership for an uprising and discourage future caudillos like Castro, by publicly excluding themselves from public office for two years after liberation;
- 6) announce the objectives of the revolution from the Cuban mainland, make clear that a detailed program will not be imposed but must be worked out with the democratic participation of the Cuban people, have it understood that no one person nor any exile group can claim the right to speak for all the Cuban people;
- 7) establish Free University of Havana facilities in a Central American Republic to train exile students, excluding partisan politics (as guests of a friendly country) and political undesirables, partly as a lure to defect Cuban youth through a superior educational program, with Radio Education to be beamed at Cuba;

- 8) make the Cuban hero Major Huber Matos an effective revolutionary symbol and provisional leader (the mystique of an unseen man leading a revolution from a dungeon cell); initiate a student sponsored "Save the Rosenbergs"-type campaign (complete with riots and demonstrations), not in the US but in Latin America, to "Free Matos!" and free the estimated forty to seventy-five thousand political prisoners in Cuba (about whom there has been astonishingly little concern) and collect money to assist their families;
- 9) halt haphazard raids and attacks which might harm innocent people (allowing Castro to speak of dead women and children), concentrate on key military (particularly foreign), industrial and communications installations, avoiding bloodshed if possible; gain the cooperation of other exiles and insurgents by offering arms and equipment in return for coordination and cooperation;

C. Revolutionary Program

The following are suggestions for a public program which the exiles should announce on the Cuban mainland through radio and leaflets under the banner of the "Authentic 26th of July Movement" and with Matos as their provisional leader. The feasibility and the details of this program would of course have to be determined by the reputable exiles themselves; whatever are its contents, its primary purpose is to appeal to the people within Cuba. The principles to be enunciated would include:

- 1) Political freedom, civil liberties, rule of law and respect for individual privacy; and social justice along the lines of the 1940 Constitution. Implementation of the original aims of the 26th of July Movement. All political, social and economic programs to be voted on freely by all the Cuban people.
- 2) Exile leaders exclude themselves from accepting political office (a Castro tactic). All office-holders will be elected and for specific periods of time. No more caudillos like Batista or Castro. The CAS will be asked to help provisional leaders to administer until national and local elections are held twelve months after liberation.

- 3) Restore university autonomy and the free exchange of ideas and scholars. Espousal of all political ideas permitted, but Communist and Fascist political parties forbidden for a period of five years. Children will be taught the true Cuban ideals of Marti.
- 4) No labor without pay. Workers can form their own trade unions and elect their own leaders without government interference. Sick leave and other benefits to be restored. Peasants will be given the choice of: a) owning their own land; b) finding employment on cooperatives; c) obtaining training and work in urban areas.
- 5) Elimination of capital punishment, exclusion of reprisals against cadres of the present regime; those guilty of atrocities to be judged by an impartial jury under OAS supervision; prevention of unnecessary killing of Cubans by Cubans; transformation of the Isles of Pines into a national park, and the prison into a technical school for the young.
- 6) Recommend a mixed type of economy: state, local, cooperative and private enterprise. Decisions will be made on the basis of experiment with ultimate decisions determined by referendum of the Cuban people.
- 7) Property will not be restored to Batistianos and Communists. Foreign owned properties will be compensated on the basis of 1958 tax assessed evaluation over a period of fifteen years. Foreign owned companies have the choice of this compensation or restoration of 49% ownership plus 51% compensated provided they are willing to assist modernization and share management on all levels with Cuban nationals.
- 8) Foreign investment will be carefully regulated along the lines of the Mexican Revolution, with 51% ownership rule applicable to all enterprises. For a period of at least two years Cuba will not accept unilateral economic assistance from the West or from the Communist bloc, but will seek

aid and technical assistance from the international organizations such as the UN or the CAS and from such countries as Sweden and Israel. (This might not be practical, but should have public appeal.)

(An outcry against revolutionary exile proposals for the handling of foreign property and investment by shortsighted American business interests with assets in Cuba will have the beneficial effect of increasing the appeal and legitimacy of the exiles putting forth this program.)

Anything less than a program of this kind will confirm Castro's frequent and effective warning to the Cubans: "They will take it away from you." This program should be acceptable to the 26th of July leaders who refused to accept Castro's dictatorship and a Communist society. It should also appeal to ranking Cuban nationalists who remained in Cuba.

D. Exile Radio Activities

Exile broadcasts from Latin American countries or from international waters should attempt to transmit occasionally from the Cuban mainland or give the appearance of so doing, since it may be difficult to convey revolutionary inspiration from abroad. Exile broadcasts can be justified by recalling the totalitarian logic by which Castro demands non-intervention in his affairs while he intervenes in the internal affairs of other nations. Operational difficulties should be admitted to the Cuban people with the explanation that mainland broadcasts will become more regular and frequent when the Soviets leave with all their weapons.

Exile radio activity is essential for the following reasons and purposes:

- 1) It can harass and ridicule Castro directly by interrupting the transmission of his speeches: "Fidel has no chin"; "Why did you kill Cienfuegos?"

- 2) Keep alive hope and the original aims of the 26th of July Movement, play its anthem (now forbidden), and remind Cubans that they and the revolution have been betrayed. Therefore, it can portray Castro as the Counter-revolutionary.
- 3) Incite and teach no revolt but riskless sabotage and passive resistance as the first stage of rebel planning. "Cuban food yes, Soviet sugar cane no!" Guevara's guerrilla handbook can be used against Guevara.
- 4) If Castro retaliates in a brutal manner against insurgents who have attacked Soviet installations, it can help direct Cuban nationalism against the "Soviet occupation force."
- 5) After engaging democratic Latin American students in a "Free Matos!" campaign, it can raise this cry within Cuba and create a rallying symbol in the person of an authentic revolutionary hero, lodged in a prison once occupied by Castro.
- 6) The Revolutionary Program should be announced from the Sierra Maestra (from the source of the struggle) partly to infuriate Castro and in sentimental appeal to the non-Communist revolutionaries still in Cuba; "Unions for the workers, land for the peasants, Cuba for the Cubans!" The main appeal would be directed at the urban classes.
- 7) It can repeat Castro's broken promises regarding civil liberties, free press, elections, land reform: "Marti si, Communismo no."
- 8) By broadcasting accurate information about the outside world, it can remind Cubans of their isolation and help cope with a problem described by Jaime Benitez: "...for want of adequate information from the outside, divergences of opinion within the country grow undernourished and eventually stifled..."

- 9) Radio Free Havana University can keep alive the ideals of freedom and democracy through political education programs: "The autonomous university is the cradle of liberty." "this is the democratic creed that Marti preached," etc.
- 10) It can emphasize that the Revolution is purely Cuban and not exportable to other countries such as Brazil, Chile or Mexico (for an interesting reaction).

Discrediting Castro in Latin America

Fidel Castro regards himself as a transformer of history—a Bolshevik Bolivar—and he sustains himself psychologically by the exaggerated role he has been able to play in the Cold War and within the communist bloc. His ability to manipulate mass emotions and to maintain political momentum stems in large measure from the heroic role he plays in a David-Goliath political setting. Thus as long as Goliath (the US) continues to appear to be his main threat, the longer he will be able to feed his own ego and maintain his heroic reputation with Cubans and with important anti-Yankee elements in Latin America who already have deep-seated prejudices against the US.

We propose that the president of a small Central American republic be induced to assume a David role in which he employs ridicule and invective to make of Castro an enraged and impotent Goliath, thereby substantially reducing Castro's prestige and conspiratorial effectiveness throughout Latin America. For the sake of illustration it will be assumed that the republic is Costa Rica, a country dedicated to freedom and democracy. Costa Rica is half the size of Cuba, has a population of only 1.2 million, and a per capita annual GNP of over \$400. (comparable to pre-Castro Cuba). Moreover, Costa Rica possesses the unique advantage of a population which is 88% literate, and no army save a civil security force of some 2,700 men.

Costa Rican president Francisco Orlich is an educated and forceful man who actively participated in fighting during the 1948 Costa Rican revolution and later helped repel an insurrectionary raid from Nicaragua. He belongs to the Figueres-led political group in Costa Rica which has promoted democracy with such fervor abroad that it has been accused internally of "international adventurism."

As a consequence, if Orlich were to accept this proposed role, he might be obliged to strengthen his political position within Costa Rica. By placing his own house in the best possible order, he would increase his effectiveness in this proposed role. If Castro can be provoked into a public polemic with Orlich, Orlich would be obliged to prove his consistency by expressing some criticism of other authoritarian states. US effectiveness might be equal to its ability to remain publicly aloof.

Orlich's opening maneuver would follow along these lines. He would present Costa Rica as a functioning democracy which is achieving its social revolution in freedom—in contrast to Cuba. That its aims are peaceful is attested by the fact that it has no army. It is justifiably proud of having more teachers than policemen. These and other real achievements should be made known to the

Cuban people by radio broadcast.

Once Castro is provoked into responding to these measures, Orlich would step up the power of his transmitter so that all Cubans will come into range for clear reception. Although Orlich would probably need little or no coaching in this role, the following are examples of lines he might adopt:

- 1) Politely request that "brother" Fidel refrain from interfering in the affairs of democratic sovereign states. Invite the Cuban people to visit a land of freedom and social justice--when they are again free to travel.
- 2) Deny vehemently that he believes that Fidel is mad--as is alleged by some medical authorities, admit the possibility that he might, however, be a little sick mentally and for this reason deserving of kindness and understanding.
- 3) Express frequent praise for the Cuban people and its noble traditions, make clear that disdain is only directed at Castro and his fellow-puppet entourage.
- 4) Take advantage of Castro's vanity, accuse him of sporting a beard simply because he has no chin. His proprietor Khrushchev needs no beard, dare his vassal to be man enough to shave.
- 5) Describe the free and happy people of Costa Rica, a land without concentration camps, without political prisoners, where citizens are not required to spy on each other, where the dignity of privacy is respected. Explain that he has come to office via a free election, other political parties are allowed and dissenting views are, in fact, encouraged.
- 6) Invite unarmed Cuban observers to learn about democracy. Remind Castro of his dealings with Trujillo.
- 7) Make no mention of the US or the Alliance for Progress.

If Castro responds to this baiting, Orlich can defy him, emphasize the absence of a military establishment and declare that a free people--even without any armaments--has nothing to fear from a daring and silly dictator. Orlich will be obliged to be really other Latin American countries to Costa Rica's defense, and the

anticipated excesses of Castro's fury would do much to discredit him in Latin America.

It is imperative that the "Colossus of the North" remove itself from direct confrontation with a "small, defenseless country." Castro needs to be pitted against a competitor on his own level, one not vulnerable to charges of "imperialism," "dollar-diplomacy" and other shibboleths to which Latin Americans instinctively respond. Costa Rica or a similar country is invulnerable to these charges.

When the American public observes Castro responding to the hounding of little Costa Rica, it will come to view the Cuban problem with perspective and without hysteria or obsession. In turn, when Castro finds himself out to size, his new perspective might impel him into obsessive and hysterical behavior. Assuming a sympathetic attitude for a sick man on the part of the Cuban people, they might decide to dispense with his services, without violence.

This proposal is a further effort to discredit Castro, which in conjunction with other efforts, might create internal stresses leading to Castro's removal by Cubans. At the least, it should help to discredit him in Latin America, it might provoke him into surfacing his aggressive intentions, and it might provide an excuse for additional OAS measures against him.

Destroying Castro's Image by Ridicule

The Cuban sense of humor is ideally suited to poking fun at even the Maximum Leader. With a population of only six and a half million, Cuba has 1,300,000 radio and 370,000 television receivers. The media of television and radio are therefore essential in connecting Castro's psychological needs, his charismatic popularity, and revolutionary control over the Cuban population with his defiance of the US. This arrangement is vulnerable to broadcast interference from outside Cuba, and it offers opportunities to subject Castro to ridicule. Castro's extreme sense of dignidad, however, will not permit him to find this amusing and the Cuban reaction might have considerable impact on the less stable elements of his personality.

As Latin America's most accomplished orator, Castro's broadcast exhibitions of sympathy for and identification with the under-dog and the masses are so accomplished that they may be partly genuine. They are the source of his strength and appeal. Paranoia, however, is his most salient personality trait and to him this affliction is a boon.

It fits ideally the role he seeks to play. He would create enemies if they did not already exist and his defiance of these enemies, which is frequently headlined in the press ("Castro Still Defiant," "Castro Shouts Defiance of CAS") impelled him to an effort to defy Khrushchev. This stance of apparent heroism has been linked with Cuban nationalism. Javier Pazos offers this analysis: "Fidel Castro...knows very well that the regime he has established can only maintain itself in power by confronting the Cuban people with an external menace. Both the Communists and Castro need to be in constant strife with the US in order to survive."

(On the other hand, when it is tactically to Castro's advantage, he could stress his role as a world leader by emphasizing coexistence. Castro may decide that he has achieved eminence on a par with Khrushchev and Mao, and he might temporarily confine his activities to maintaining his position).

Cubans and other Latin Americans enjoy observing Castro pluck the American Eagle's tail feathers. In turn, his audiences satisfy his need for adulation. Reporter Donald Grant states that, "In Castro's complex personality, vanity looms so large that some who have known him intimately think it verges on pathological narcissism." In reality, Castro rules by television and public appearance, simultaneously feeding his ego and retaining his popularity. His own description of this therapy is: "My medicine is the people...I thrive on seeing and talking to the people."

Radio and television transmission could be carried out by exiles using a well-known Cuban broadcaster, or someone with a quick and acid wit, either by adding to Castro's dialogue by mimicking his voice (as the "Minimum Leader") or by speaking to and commenting on his dialogue during a live transmission.

Radio interference will pose no problems. Line of sight sound transmission to television receivers would be complicated since it would involve some risks to those operating nearby but outside the three mile limit. A transmitting balloon antenna, for example, would furnish greater range but would be difficult to locate

and subject to weather conditions. The US would not, of course, be directly involved in this operation.

The minimal arrangement requires that the anti-Castro wit be able to receive at least the sound of Castro's voice while transmitting his own voice to Castro's radio listeners with some clarity and range. An example of how this might sound is contained in an imaginary interference with a real speech delivered by Castro at the Rene Fraga Moreno sports field in Mantanzas, broadcast over Havana National Radio and Television Network 0224 GMT, 31 March 1963 (FBIS text).

/mimicking Castro/

...This is something fundamental and of special importance to the revolution. /which I have betrayed/ Human intelligence and human work is what creates and produces. /not beards and cigars/ For that reason, in the Oriente mountains, in the pre-vocational school, /in Siberia/ there are at present nearly 4,000 students, in the schools /and prisons/ of Las Minas del Frio (applause) who will be meeting gradually our /Khrushchev's/ future needs, the plans for improving our present teachers, who year by year are bettering themselves to fulfill their sacred duty/ to Russia/ For that reason we should glance to the future, because the future belongs completely to us. /Blas Roca/ (at this point a monitoring technician hands Castro a note explaining this interference. Castro shakes his fist in defiance as a voice says) / I am the Gusano Maximo and I hate all Cubans! /

/dialogue with and comments on Castro/

The imperialists have tried to copy these tactics of revolutionaries, /Fidel, you are lying!/ but the mentality of a counterrevolutionary/ like brother Raul/ will never be the mentality of a revolutionary/ come on, Fidel, shave/ the mentality of the counterrevolutionary will be crime, terror, and one of awaiting for the foreigner to come and invade. /what nonsense/

And here in this province, /where is your chin, Fidel?/ at the end of January, and at the beginning of February/ March too?/ two workers of La Co were murdered./ you did it, Fidel, you butcher!/ A family, with two children, was shot to death;/ you communist murderer/ and thus several crimes were committed/ you're lying again, you be....

Without speculating on the long and short term repercussions of such tactics, this affront to Castro's personal dignity might, as a start, amuse the Cuban people, enrage Castro and help to destroy his charismatic image. Personal dignity is the touchstone of the Latin American personality. Affronts to Castro's personal vanity might make him wilder and more open to terror than existing economic and political pressures.

Psychological Guidelines

Latin American support of US policy towards Cuba is impeded by Yankeeophobia, historically justified or imagined fears of the Colossus of the North, and the spectacle of direct US confrontation with a small Caribbean country. To many Latin Americans, the Cuban regime is linked with a social and economic revolution. Therefore, the US seems to oppose a social revolutionary trend and is portrayed as a "reactionary" country by the left. Within the US, there is a grave danger that public, press, and partisan obsession with the Cuban problem will tend to force counter-productive policy actions such as immediate responses to Castro's charges or the issuance of overly precise and unnecessary policy statements. Such public attention only serves to nourish Castro's ego, arouse Cuban nationalism to his support, and enhance his stature elsewhere.

There is no reason for US officials and media to reply to charges and taunts emanating from Castro's verbosity, and it does not become a great nation to hasten to honor such provocation with a reply. Propaganda cannot be refuted immediately by truth, nor can one debate with someone uninterested in facts. The only remedy is the steady flow of the truth, which in time builds up the credibility of the medium employed and allows truth to be identified as such.

We must erase the Bay of Pigs image by not playing up the Brigade or the individuals connected with it. If nothing succeeds like success, nothing fails like failure itself.

Except for special circumstances, additional statements of US policy towards Cuba will tend to inhibit US freedom of action by limiting alternatives, confining policy rigidly to a single course, arousing more questions than are answered, or alerting Castro to a possible policy change. Moreover, Castro will use the opportunity to claim that the US is again threatening the Cuban people. Both in the matter of pronouncements and with respect to overt policies it is usually preferable to have the initiative taken by one or more members of the CAS. To do otherwise confirms the Latin American conviction that the US is overly

obsessed with Cuba, to the detriment of the Alliance for Progress.

Direct US involvement in anti-Castro information propaganda campaigns creates, rather than destroys, sympathy for Castro in Latin America. Therefore, as much as possible, unattributable material and sources should be used. For the US publicly to ignore Castro would be to deprive him of his largest audience, and it might provoke him into attention-seeking behavior, which in turn might have a sobering effect on Latin American oligarchs who are resisting reforms. It is really by his own actions (shooting of political prisoners, admission of Marxist ideological motivation, and allowing the Soviet missile buildup) that Castro has lost face in Cuba and elsewhere. Rather than engage in a continuing public polemic with Castro, thereby elevating him to our level, the US and its media should keep public commentary on Cuba to a minimum.

Should it become desirable or necessary for the US to comment on the proposed Exile Revolutionary Program, if it is announced, the following guidelines are recommended:

- 1) The US is pleased to note that the formulators defer to the Cuban people for ultimate approval of their program. The future of Cuba can only be decided by the Cubans. We applaud this democratic procedure.
- 2) Every free man awaits the day when Cuba is no longer a Soviet satellite. The Cuban Revolution, although betrayed by a "puppet," still lives. Our sympathies lie with the brave men who risk and give their lives to free their homeland.
- 3) It is understood that the Free World would come to the assistance of a free Cuba. It is for the Cuban people to make a determination on economic assistance after they have reviewed the economic mess left by the Communists.

Since it is known that the US is always prepared to assist noncommunist countries in difficulty, it might appear patronizing and seem like bribery for the US to over-emphasize its capacity to grant economic aid to a free Cuba. Mention of the Alliance for Progress in this context will only exalt its negative (anti-Castro) aspects.